Recent developments in the legal world raise the issue of free association. I think Americans support a fairly broad freedom of association. We tend to hold that businesses and people have the right to choose their partners and collaborators, so long as those choices don’t contravene some other important right (think anti-discrimination laws). Generally, a firm choosing not to hire someone for expressing an opinion they find morally repugnant is understandable. We can’t force the firm to collaborate with someone diametrically opposed to its values, and trying to force a relationship would arguably be to the detriment of both parties.

But what about when basically everyone refuses to associate with a given person? I can imagine two different classes of this situation: first, where the person is unfairly reviled, and second, where the person is justifiably reviled.

In the former class, suppose someone, person X, is born with a severe physical deformity that makes him unappealing to the residents of Alphabet City. On an individual level, we wouldn’t think to criticize person Y for withholding his affection from X because it is well within his right to choose to not associate with any given person. The situation may be more complicated when all the residents of Alphabet City make the same individual decision. Residents A, B, C, etc. all separately decide that X is undeserving of their companionship, friendship, or love. While we can’t point to any discrete individual wronging X, it seems that on the macro-scale X is being wronged by the community. Or, even if we do think A, B, and C restricting their affection is unfair (after all, X didn’t choose to be this way), I imagine most people would be hesitant about using the state to force the residents to do otherwise. So, X goes on living unloved.

Take the same situation except instead of X being deformed, he holds an opinion or belief set that is so beyond the pale that none of the residents of Alphabet City want to interact with him. In this situation, I imagine most would think X’s isolation is less problematic than in the former scenario. If X holds despicable views, there should be some social sanction, but should the punishment be proportional? In the extreme case, are we comfortable with X’s isolation being taken so far that he cannot work to obtain the basic resources necessary for his survival? If everyone hates X, they may refuse to sell him food, land, etc., refuse to do business with him, and urge others to do the same. Here, X would not only go unloved but may even die because of his isolation. In this way, being totally despised may conflict with rights to life.

If there is a right to be loved (Matthew Liao makes a novel argument for at least children), then it seems whether the person is unfairly or deservedly isolated is not relevant. In both cases, X’s complete isolation would contravene his right to be loved. Trying to rectify this contravention, however, would necessarily contravene someone else in Alphabet City’s right to free association. Even if we bit the bullet and said X’s right to be loved is so fundamental that we can force people to associate with him, we cannot ensure the authentic emotions required to properly fulfill the right. We can’t manufacture emotion via state power. At most, X would have a thin facsimile of friendship and love in his life, and those who “love” him would actually resent X and their forced relationship.

I don’t have a complete answer to the questions raised here. I think it’s worth thinking about for anyone who believes in both freedom of association and some form of a right to be loved. For those who don’t believe in a right to be loved, the hypotheticals might be less problematic, but they still need to ask themselves what degree of isolation is appropriate in cases like the above two. Of particular salience, where someone is deservedly isolated, does the person deserve to die? Or does a different right, like one to life, demand we at least minimally associate with that person to keep him alive?

Let me know what you think. Check yourself by substituting in whatever substantive moral stances you despise. Also try imagining a moral stance one of your political/moral opponents would revile.